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Electronic Health Records
HOW TO SUTURE THE GAP BETWEEN PRIVACY
AND EFFICIENT DELIVERY OF HEALTHCARE
INTRODUCTION
For the past fifty years, electronic healthcare (E-Health)
has been a rapidly growing industry. With new innovations
came more accessibility for doctors and health providers to
retrieve patient data from almost anywhere, and to give patients
access to their own information. The growth of electronic
healthcare will set up other opportunities, such as decreased
costs1 and increased access to healthcare.2
One recent innovation in healthcare is the Electronic
Health Record (EHR), which is defined by the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services as “an electronic version of a
patient’s medical history that is maintained by the provider
over time, and may include all of the key administrative
clinical data relevant to that person’s care under a particular
provider . . . .”3 This clinical data may include immunizations,
reports, prescriptions, familial history, and anything that may
assist in health care maintenance.4 The data also includes the
patient’s electronic medical record, which has less detailed
information than that in EHRs.5
Although various studies reveal that the implementation
of EHRs will be beneficial,6 many are concerned with the lack of
1 Randolph C. Barrows Jr., M.D. & Paul D. Clayton, Ph.D., Privacy,
Confidentiality, and Electronic Medical Records 3 JAMIA 139, 147 (1996)
2 Id. at 139.
3 E-HEALTH, PRIVACY, AND SECURITY LAW 2 (W. Andrew H. Gantt III ed., 2d
ed. 2011) (citing Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Electronic Health Records,
CMS.GOV, http://www.cms.gov/ehealthrecords/ (last updated Mar. 26, 2012)).
4 BYRON HAMILTON, ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORDS 4 (2d ed. 2010).
5 Id.
6 Analytics in Healthcare, SAS 3 (2009); see, e.g., Julia Adler-Milstein, Ph.D.
et al., Effect of Electronic Health Records on Health Care Costs: Longitudinal
Comparative Evidence From Community Practices, 159 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MEDICINE
97, 103 (2013); Samuel J. Wang, M.D., Ph.D. et al., A Cost-Benefit Analysis of
Electronic Medical Records in Primary Care, 114 AM. J. MED. 397, 401 (2003).
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privacy and the threat of potential breaches.7 Computer hackers
can break into storage database and access patient records.8
Further, if a patient generally asks for “all [of her] health
information”, a doctor may accidentally disclose sensitive
information that they may not legally release.9
In 2009, Congress passed the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act10, which expands the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) to include
all “business associates” within its security and privacy
provisions.11 HIPAA was enacted in 1996 to better protect
patient information through increased security and privacy
standards for information that could be linked to a specific
patient.12 After the implementation of the American Recovery
and Reinvestment Act, the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) established new regulations13 that standardize
how EHRs must be set up.
Despite Congressional efforts to protect patient privacy,
there are still privacy issues that must be addressed. With the
increase of computer hacking14 and accidental releases of
private information, there are continued concerns with security
until the patients know that the people protecting their records
are doing so to the best of their ability. Congress has placed
safeguards to try to protect patient information. These safeguards
include encrypting information,15 de-identifying specific patient
information when storing health records,16 and recording each
time an EHR is accessed.17 Some of these safeguards are included
in the criteria that the creators of EHRs, private companies that
See, e.g., Barrows, supra note 1, at 139.
HIPAA Regulatory Alert: Computer Hackers Step Up Attacks on Health
Care Records, AHC NEWSLETTERS (May 20, 2008), http://insurancenewsnet.com/
oarticle/2008/05/20/hipaa-regulatory-alert-computer-hackers-step-up-attacks-on-health
-care-records-a-94434.html#.UtmMchb0Ay4.
9 Donnaline
Richman, Legal Pitfalls of Electronic Medical Records,
DATELINE: A NEWSL. FOR MLMIC-INSURED PHYSICIANS, DENTISTS, & FACILITIES
(MLMIC, New York, N.Y.), Fall 2013, at 6.
10 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123
Stat. 115 (2009).
11 Id. § 13401; see also Corrine P. Parver, Esq. & Savannah ThompsonHoffman, On the Front Lines: How the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of
2009 Changed HIPPA’s Privacy Requirements, CCH HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE
LETTER 1, 4 (July 28, 2009).
12 Diane Kutzko et al., HIPAA in Real Time: Practical Implications of the
Federal Privacy Rule, 51 DRAKE L. REV. 403, 407 (2003).
13 45 C.F.R. § 170.314 (2012).
14 See infra text accompanying notes 25-30.
15 45 C.F.R. §§ 170.210(a); 170.302(s)-(v).
16 Id. § 164.514(a).
17 Id. § 170.210(b).
7

8
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develop the software, known as vendors, must meet, but there is
little incentive for these vendors to comply. In order to
encourage compliance, HHS should impose a civil monetary
penalty if the vendors fail to continuously comply with the
criteria, similar to one already in place in a different aspect of
medical data law. This would require the vendors to pay a
substantial fee that would clearly reflect the importance of
patient privacy. We are in a new age of sharing medical
information, so the law surrounding the exchange of health
information needs to reflect this, which is what a civil monetary
penalty would do.
Part I of this note provides some background on EHRs,
exploring the benefits and accompanying risks of EHRs. Part II
explains the complex set-up and certification process of EHR
software by HHS. It then argues that this certification is not
enough by comparing EHR software certification to credit card
certification. Part III will look at an existing civil monetary
penalty and then explain why that penalty should also apply to
vendors of health information technology. This penalty should
be a sliding scale so that it is proportional to the vendor’s
failure to comply with privacy regulations. In assessing the
penalty, regulations should consider various factors such as the
length of time the certification requirements were not met and
the detectability of such failure. Part IV will strengthen the
argument to expand the civil monetary penalty through an
analysis of the effects of its imposition. This will show that the
implementation of the penalty is not only better for patients
than the mere certification process, but is also better for
medical facilities and the vendors themselves.
I.

BACKGROUND

A.

Explanation of EHRs

EHRs, very basically, are a way to store and transfer
patient information. EHRs store three types of data: quantitative,
qualitative, and transactional. Quantitative data is information
that is dependent on the individual patient, such as laboratory
values that are inputted after doctors review test results.
Qualitative data is information that will not change from patientto-patient, such as text-based documents, like medical books and
demographics. Lastly, transactional data is information that
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tracks transactions from the medical provider to the patient, and
vice versa, such as medication that has been delivered.18
One benefit of EHRs is that they ease access to
information. Patients and doctors are not bound to a single paper
chart; the information is accessible almost instantaneously from
almost any web-based device.19 Instead of spending time
searching in a record room for an individual patient’s file, doctors
can sit down with the patient at a computer and immediately
access all of the patient’s medical information. As a result of
using a computer, the information is kept up to date because of
immediate entry into the system when the data is discovered.20
When test results come back to the primary doctor, that doctor
no longer has to make the extra effort to include the results in a
paper chart. Instead, the laboratory doctors would have already
placed the results in the patient’s record after they found the
results. Due to the easy access of EHRs on a computer, doctors
no longer need to be in the office to access records. They can
write prescriptions, look up patients’ charts, and view the status
of a particular patient from almost anywhere as long as their
device has access to their practice’s EHR database.21
A familiar stereotype about doctors is that they have
terrible handwriting.22 Another benefit of inputting information
into a computer is that it makes the information legible. This
guarantees that the medical charts and all other information in
the EHR are clear. Clarity of patient information leads to less
confusion and avoids possible mistakes as a result of an
illegible health record.23 Further, hospital discharge notices are
created for the individual patient based on his or her individual
ailments and prescriptions. EHRs also make it easier to quickly
identify which patients have been prescribed recalled drugs
and decrease the likelihood of misplaced or lost lab work
because the information is stored on a single database.24
Despite these benefits, the implementation of EHRs
raises significant privacy concerns due to potential security
18 Travis B. Murdoch, M.D., MSc & Allan S. Detsky, M.D., Ph.D., The
Inevitable Application of Big Data to Health Care, 309 JAMA 1351, 1351 (2013).
19 Introduction
to Electronic Health Records, THE MCGRAW-HILL
COMPANIES 8 (2011).
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Donald M. Berwick & David E. Winickoff, The Truth About Doctors’
Handwriting: A Prospective Study, 313 BMJ 1657, 1657 (1996), available at http://bmj.com/
content/313/7072/1657.
23 An Introduction to Electronic Health Records, supra note 19, at 8.
24 Id. at 9.
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vulnerabilities. In a 2012 study, 94% of healthcare organizations
reported that they had at least one security breach within the
last two years.25 Forty-five percent of those healthcare
organizations that had been breached reported having at least
five breaches.26 This is a substantial increase from a 2010 study
where 86% of healthcare organizations reported that they had
had at least one security breach in the past two years but only
29% reported that they had more than five.27 Negligence on the
part of those meant to protect EHRs primarily caused these
breaches. In 2012, employee mistakes and inactions caused 42%
of breaches.28 The percentage of criminal attacks on information
technology security also increased from 20% in 2010 to 33% in
2012, at the time of the study.29 Moreover, 46% of breaches were
a result of lost or stolen devices.30
When EHRs are lost or stolen there is a risk of medical
identity theft because EHRs include personal health facts,
such as names, personal identity, and billing information.31
This can create a problem because the thief can use this
information fraudulently, including to obtain medical services,
and prescription drugs, while continuing to bill the victim.32
Moreover, the personal facts that are found within EHRs, such
as illness or genetic traits, can be revealed.33 This revelation
can lead to embarrassment or discrimination.34 EHR privacy,
accordingly, is of the utmost importance.
In addition to privacy concerns, there are several other
concerns with the full implementation of EHRs. First, there is
no guarantee that doctors will entirely fill out comment sections.
Doctors may resort to simply checking the boxes provided
instead of taking the time to write detailed information about a
specific patient.35 Even if a doctor decides to include information
in the comment section, they may simply repeat what they said
25 PONEMON INST., THIRD ANNUAL BENCHMARK STUDY ON PATIENT PRIVACY
& DATA SECURITY 5 (2012), available at http://www.ponemon.org/news-2/45.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 2.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 See generally PONEMON INST., THIRD ANNUAL SURVEY ON MEDICAL
IDENTITY THEFT (2012), available at http://www.ponemon.org/library/third-annualsurvey-on-medical-identity-theft-ponemon-institute.
32 Id. at 1.
33 PONEMON INST., supra note 25, at 2.
34 Louise Slaughter, Genetic Information Non-Discrimination Act, 50 HARV.
J. ON LEGIS. 41, 44-45 (2013).
35 Richman, supra note 9, at 2.
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on an earlier visit by cutting information from one section and
pasting it into a new section, forgetting to include any new
information.36 This negatively impacts the patient because
their EHR will not reflect details related to this specific visit;
even minor differences may matter in the future. Second,
although typed notes are more legible, spelling errors still
persist and there are no universal abbreviations.37 This may
make it difficult for a subsequent doctor to clearly understand
the patient’s medical history or it may affect pharmaceutical
information, leading to wrong prescriptions or diagnosing
adverse medications. Lastly, EHRs are expensive, even though
the price varies depending on the size of the practice and the
EHR employed. Some hospitals and healthcare networks can
spend at minimum $10 million on setting up the entire system.38
Smaller group practices may spend anywhere between $10,000
and $20,000 for each doctor they employ.39 The expense does not
stop after the system has been set up. Maintaining the entire
system can cost the practices an additional twenty-five percent
every year,40 which could have adverse consequences on
practices, especially the smaller practices.
The benefits of EHRs substantially outweigh the
downsides, so medical facilities with EHRs are still better off than
the alternative. The speed and clarity prevent bigger problems.
For example, the only time a doctor will have an incomplete
medical history for a patient would be the first time the doctor is
implementing EHRs. Once EHRs are already in place, a
newborn’s medical information would be put into his or her EHR,
which would then be accessible, by every subsequent doctor
throughout his or her lifetime. Moreover, as detailed later on,
EHRs are inevitable.41 The ability to communicate with
different medical providers quickly and with a full and
accurate patient medical record is extremely important in
today’s society.

Id. at 2-3.
Id. at 1.
38 Analytics in Healthcare, supra note 6, at 3.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 See infra text accompanying notes 230-36 (discussing the cohesiveness of
EHRs to benefit medical treatment).
36
37
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History of EHRs

EHRs were first used in the 1960s at The Mayo Clinic in
Rochester, Minnesota, and the Medical Center Hospital in
Vermont.42 These two facilities implemented EHRs in the hopes
that through such use would come easier access to the growing
complexity of medicine and medical records.43 Over the next
decade, EHRs further expanded to better “capture [] clinical
information.”44 These improved EHRs could now record various
information, such as test results, medications, and surgeries.45
Furthermore, the method of storage changed within this decade
as well. At first these separated servers had to stay within a
relatively small distance from the facility and the facility kept a
backup server on-premise.46 EHR vendors were no longer
constrained to store them within the medical facility. Servers
could now be remote, continuing to improve patient privacy.47
In the late 1980s, the federal government became
involved in the implementation of EHRs, showing its dedication
to EHR use as well as EHRs’ importance and necessity through
subsidizing the growth of EHRs. In 1988, the government
awarded a grant to Composite Health Care System to help the
company maintain their intricate database, used to store and
maintain patient records. This contract was continuously
renewed until 1996.48
Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama have
each commented on the importance of EHRs. President Bush
stated that he wanted patients to have access to EHRs in order
to improve the overall quality of provided healthcare.49 President
Obama said that a stimulus package, specifically targeted to

An Introduction to Electronic Health Records, supra note 19, at 2.
Id.
44 Gilad J. Kuperman, M.D. & Reed M. Gardner, Ph.D., The Impact of the
HELP Computer System on the LDS Hospital Paper Medical Record, 12 TOP HEALTH
REC. MGMT. 76 (1990).
45 Id.
46 POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF MEDICAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS 21 (1977),
available at www.princeton.edu/~ota/disk3/1977/7708/770805.PDF.
47 Id. at 26-30.
48 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/AIMD-96-39, DEFENSE ACHIEVES
WORLDWIDE DEPLOYMENT OF COMPOSITE HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 3 (1996), available at
http://www.gao.gov/assets/230/222364.pdf.
49 The White House, Transforming HealthCare: The President’s Health
Information
Technology
Plan
(2004),
available
at
georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/technology/economic_policy200404/chap3.html.
42

43
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improve EHRs, could help prevent errors and save money.50 In
2009, President Obama stated that ideally all medical records
should be computerized in the hopes that not only could they
improve healthcare and create jobs, but also save lives.51
Today, E-Health is defined as “the use of digital
information and communication technologies to improve people’s
health and health care.”52 The purpose of E-Health is to
electronically store patient data, prescribe medication, and allow
the patient to have easier access to her own records,53 which is
exactly what EHRs do. Recently, as a result of the 2009 Health
Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act,
regional health information organizations were set up for
health care providers to better communicate within a
particular region.54 The purpose of these regional health
information organizations is to bring together various medical
providers within a local community to better exchange data.55
These organizations have been slow-moving in the overall
broad exchange of health information.56
The 2009 Health Information Technology for Economic
and Clinical Health Act set up a three-factor approach to health
information exchange.57 First, the Act states that participation
in the health information exchange is part of the criteria for
medical facilities to receive federal incentives for using EHRs.58
Second, the Act encourages states to create affordable options for
using and implementing EHRs. HHS set up a four year $548
million State Health Information Exchange Cooperative
Agreement Program to ensure that states could set up a system
to share medical information.59 Lastly, the Act supports the
Direct Project, which is a system of Internet services, similar to
e-mail, used to send and retrieve electronic health information.60
50 Robert Pear, Privacy Issue Complicates Push to Link Medical Data, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 18, 2009, at A16, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/18/us/
politics/18health.html?_r=0.
51 Id.
52 U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., What is e-Health?, http://health.gov/
communication/ehealth/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2015).
53 E-HEALTH, PRIVACY, AND SECURITY LAW, supra note 3, at 2-3; Parver &
Thompson-Hoffman, supra note 11.
54 Julia Adler-Milstein, Ph.D. & Ashish K. Jha, M.D., M.P.H., Sharing
Clinical Data Electronically: A Critical Challenge for Fixing the Health Care System,
307 JAMA 1695, 1695 (2012).
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id.
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The Act assumes that through this original promotion of the
secure transfer of information from one provider to another, it
will further develop in the future so that there will be no need to
transfer data and providers will simply be able to search for and
retrieve information on their patients.61
C.

Types of EHRs

Today, there are two different types of EHRs: cloudbased and on-premise. Cloud-based EHRs, also called “web
based” or “Software as a Service,” have been increasingly
growing in popularity among smaller practices.62 This model is
based in the web, so facilities do not need to install the software
on their own computers.63 To access patient records, the users
sign on to a secure Internet browser, which connects the user to
the data storage.64 The vendor is responsible for maintaining the
system as well as ensuring security of the records.65 Instead of
charging medical facilities significant costs to set up the EHR
system, cloud-based vendors simply charge the facilities an
average monthly fee of approximately $200-400.66
In addition, patient care quality has substantially
increased because of cloud-based EHRs. For example, if a patient
who visited a hospital on vacation is released, and the doctor
wants to schedule them for a follow up in their hometown, the
doctor no longer needs to search for follow up facilities. Rather,
the doctor can input the patient’s zip code and find facilities
through the software and directly contact the providers listed.67
Moreover, according to facilities that already use this form of
software, the implementation and education as to how to properly
use these EHRs was relatively easy and quick to learn.68
There are issues specifically related to cloud-based
vendors. Access to EHRs depends on the vendor’s availability.
So, if the services are unavailable for any reason, the facilities
that rely on the vendor will not be able to access their patients’
Id.
Ken Terry, SaaS EHR Model Gains Physician Support, INFO. WEEK (May
17, 2012), http://www.informationweek.com/healthcare/electronic-medical-records/saasehr-model-gains-physician-support/240000562.
63 Lauren Phillips, Automating Referrals Aids Discharge Process, HEALTH
MGMT. TECH. (Mar. 2010), http://www.healthmgttech.com/articles/201003/automatingreferrals-aids-discharge-processes.php.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Terry, supra note 62.
67 Phillips, supra note 63, at 25.
68 Id.
61
62
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EHRs.69 For this reason, it is important for these vendors to
have an off-site backup server as well to ensure continued
access to EHRs.70 There are also many security risks associated
with cloud-based software. Cyber hackers can place
“eavesdropping software” within these servers, allowing them
access to all private information stored within.71 According to
Samantha Shelton, the Information Security Engineer at the
Computer Sciences Corporation, “‘[i]nformation on public
clouds are susceptible to data brokers and other computer
hackers,’ due to the multiple tenancies and the ability to access
multiple customers’ information on the same server.”72
However, the servers that contain all of this private personal
information need not be stored in the United States. Because
they are cloud-based, they can be stored in any country.73
The second type of software is the “on-premise” or
“client server”. This is the relatively more expensive type of
software because the medical facility actually buys the entire
software package and installs it onto their computers.74 The
EHR vendors might also have remote access to the software in
order to assist the medical facilities if they ever need support.75
The facility, however, is entirely responsible for maintaining
the software, backing up all information, and restoring any lost
data.76 Moreover, the medical facilities are responsible for
making certain that the data server complies with HIPAA
regulations.77 An on-premise server appears more expensive
than cloud-based software because the facilities that
implement on-premise servers pay the entire cost when they
purchase the software, exclusive of yearly maintenance fees,
whereas cloud-based software has maintenance fees included
69 Priya Das et al., Cyber-Security Threats and Privacy Controls for Cloud
Computing, Emphasizing Software as a Service, 30 THE COMPUTER & INTERNET LAW.
20, 21 (2013).
70 Id.
71 Id. at 22.
72 Id.
73 Id. Vendors would then need to comply with the foreign country’s privacy
laws and not necessarily have to comply with our privacy laws. Id.
74 Shahid N. Shah, Interoperable EMRs for the Small-to Medium-Sized Office:
On Being the CIO of Your Practice, in THE BUSINESS OF MEDICAL PRACTICE:
TRANSFORMATIONAL HEALTH 2.0 SKILLS FOR DOCTORS 299, 328 (David E. Marcinko &
Hope R. Hetico eds., 3d ed., 2011).
75 Id.
76 Id. at 329.
77 See Nefertiti C. duPont, M.D., M.P.H. et al., Selecting an Electronic Medical
Record System for Small Physician Practices, 70 NC MED. J. 399, 402 (2009) (noting that
in the client server model the physicians must maintain a secure data center, unlike the
ASP model which is designed to meet HIPAA security rule requirements).
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in the monthly fee.78 Startup-costs for on-premise servers can
range from $10,000 to $10 million, with about twenty-five
percent in maintenance a year.79 There are far fewer security
problems with on-premise servers because it is easier to know
who has access to the servers’ information. A cloud-based
server, however, may be more desirable for smaller facilities
because it does not require high start up costs.80
II.

THE CERTIFICATION PROCESS

In 2010 HHS set up regulations pertaining to the
certification of EHRs.81 This section will look into the extensive
requirements that vendors must incorporate into their software
before HHS will certify it to be sold to medical facilities.
However, this certification is not permanent;82 failure to comply
with any of the regulations will potentially rescind certification
for a short amount of time.83 Because EHRs and their regulation
are relatively new, this section will look into credit card
certification as an example as to why mere certification and the
rescinding of that certification is not enough. There needs to be
smarter deterrence to encourage vendors to continuously comply
with regulations and protect patient information.
A.

How EHRs are Certified

Before EHRs may be legally used and sold, the EHR
software must be certified pursuant to HHS regulations.84 These
regulations set out specific criteria with which each vendor must
comply. If the vendors comply with the criteria, the Office of the
National Coordinator (ONC) then certifies the software.85 After
certification, medical practices and hospitals may purchase the
software. The company can seek complete EHR certification or
partial certification, among other forms of Health Information
Technology certification that have also been laid out in the law.86

78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86

Shah, supra note 74, at 329.
Analytics in Healthcare, supra note 6, at 3.
Shah, supra note 74, at 329.
45 C.F.R. § 170.300-170.314 (2012).
Id. § 170.565.
Id. § 170.565(h)(3).
Id. § 170.302.
Id. § 170.503.
Id. § 170.510.
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To obtain certification, the software must meet the
twenty-two specific criteria described within the regulation.87
Among these criteria, EHRs must automatically generate drug
interaction and drug-allergy checks based on the individual
patient’s medications.88 Similarly, doctors must also be able to
check if drugs are a “formulary or preferred drug.”89 Each
patient’s record must be able to maintain an ongoing list of
problems, medications, and medication allergies.90 EHRs must
also be able to record a patient’s vital signs and smoking status,
as well as incorporate laboratory tests.91 Doctors must have a
way to retrieve a list of patients based on specific data,
compare medications, submit immunizations to registries, and
have access to public health information.92 There should be
means to access information specific to a patient and ways to
generate various calculations through data that the doctor can
input.93 Moreover, the user must have control over how to
access the information, ways to access it in an emergency, logoff automatically, and create an instinctive log of all actions.94
The software must also have ways to preserve integrity and
authentication, as well as set up a general encryption in addition
to an encryption whenever EHRs are exchanged.95 Further, the
regulations give particular criteria for certification for EHRs
specifically designed for an ambulatory setting96 or an inpatient
setting.97 In 2012, HHS added a new section, the 2014 Edition
electronic health record certification criteria.98 The purpose of
this section was to clarify the preexisting certification criteria.
This simplifies what the vendors need to accomplish within their
software before requesting certification.99
Vendors must be ONC certified, but having dual
certification from another certification process creates buying
assurance for potential customers.100 In 2004, the Certification
Commission for Health Information Technology was set up and
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100

Id. § 170.302.
Id. § 170.302(a).
Id. § 170.302(b).
Id. § 170.302(c)-(e).
Id. § 170. 302(f)-(h).
Id. § 170.302(i)-(l).
Id. § 170.302 (m)-(n).
Id. § 170.302(o)-(r).
Id. § 170.302(s)-(v).
Id. § 170.304.
Id. § 170.306.
Id. § 170.314.
Id.
Get Certified, CCHIT, https://www.cchit.org/onc (last visited Oct. 15, 2014).
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began certifying EHRs in 2006 to help widen the availability of
health information technology.101 However, in 2014, the
Certification Commission for Health Information Technology
announced that it will no longer certify EHR software.102 When
they certified, the commission had its own criteria based on
“functionality, interoperability, and security.”103 Moreover, there
were optional certifications that companies could qualify for as
well.104 The five types of optional certifications were: ambulatory,
inpatient, emergency department, behavioral health, and longterm and post-acute care.105 Each one had its own regulations
and criteria that the vendor had to meet in order to be certified.
Now, the commission will assist making certain that their
software complies with the 2014 Edition requirements.106
The ONC has found privacy to be so important with the
implementation of EHRs that it has established standards to
protect patient information when EHRs are created or
transferred.107 The first four standards that the software must
use in order to comply with ONC privacy protections were
imposed in 2010. First, the information contained must be
encrypted using an algorithm developed by the National
Institute of Standards and Technology.108 According to this
Institute, the algorithm is used to protect electronic data by
encrypting and decrypting patient information. Once encrypted,
the data is converted “to an unintelligible form called
ciphertext.”109 Decryption converts the ciphertext back into
coherent data.110 Second, every time that information contained
within EHRs is created, accessed, deleted, or in any way
changed the user, time, and date must be recorded.111 Third,
there must be verification if “information has not been
altered.”112 Fourth, when there is a disclosure for treatment or

Our Legacy, CCHIT, https://www.cchit.org/our-legacy (last visited Oct. 15, 2014).
Id.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Get Certified, supra note 100.
106 Id.
107 45 C.F.R. § 170.210 (2012).
108 Id. at § 170.210(a).
109 FEDERAL
INFORMATION PROCESSING STANDARDS PUBLICATION 197:
ANNOUNCING THE ADVANCED ENCRYPTION STANDARD (AES), COMPUTER SECURITY
RESOURCE CTR. (Nov. 26, 2001), available at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/
fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf.
110 Id.
111 45 C.F.R. § 170.210(b).
112 Id. § 170.210(c).
101

102
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payment, the date, time, patient, user, and description of the
specific discloser must also be recorded.113
Effective October 2012, additional privacy standards
were added to this regulation. First, an internal audit log must
be kept that records the date and time that EHR technology is
used or changed.114 Second, electronic health information
contained within the EHRs must be hashed according to an
algorithm from the National Institute of Standards and
Technology.115 Hashing is a condensed version of the information
contained within.116 Last, EHRs must include a clock
synchronized according to the Network Time Protocol.117
B.

Failure to Continuously Comply with Certification

The 11th Circuit Court of Appeals heard a case, prior to
the implementation of the HHS regulations, which demonstrated
the necessity of these certification criteria.118 In 2009, AvMed, a
Florida based corporation which provides health care services,
used a form of EHRs accessible through laptop computers.119 Two
of the computers were stolen and because the laptops were
unencrypted, the personal information contained within was
readily available for use by the thieves.120 Contained within the
laptops was “the sensitive information of approximately 1.2
million current and former AvMed members.”121 With the
implementation of the HHS regulations, the ease at which
hackers or identity thieves can access this information is severely
diminished. Encryption by itself will protect the data even when
other protections, such as firewalls, fail.122
EHR certification is not indefinite; the ONC can revoke
certification if the vendors fail to maintain the certification
criteria.123 HHS has described two types of violations in which
certification can be rescinded.124 Type-1 violations are those in
Id. § 170.210(d).
Id. § 170.210(e).
115 Id. at § 170.210(f).
116 U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, FIPS PUB 180-4, SECURE HASH STANDARD (SHS)
(2012), available at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips180-4/fips-180-4.pdf.
117 45 C.F.R. § 170.210(g).
118 Resnick v. AvMed, Inc., 693 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2012).
119 Id. at 1322.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 The Role of Encryption in Data Protection, PGP WEBCAST SUMMARY 9 (2007),
available at http://download.pgp.com/pdfs/whitepapers/PGP-Cullinane-Webcast_WP_
070205_F.pdf.
123 45 C.F.R. § 170.565 (2012).
124 Id.
113

114
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which the vendors violate a law or the integrity of the EHRs.125
Type-2 violations are noncompliance violations.126 With type-2
violations, vendors will no longer be in good standing with the
ONC and will receive a warning. If they fail to address their
lack of good standing, they are warned that their certification
will be revoked. There is also an opportunity for the vendors to
address a potential false allegation of noncompliance.127 HHS
clearly shows that integrity issues are more serious than
noncompliance violations. There is no warning from the ONC
and if the vendor is found liable for a type-1 violation they are
barred from reapplying for certification for a year.128 In April
2013 the ONC rescinded certification of two separate EHR
software programs developed by the same vendor. The ONC
discovered that neither software met the enumerated
functionality requirements, at which time it informed the
vendor and decided that both programs needed to be retested.
Both software programs failed retesting and the ONC revoked
the vendor’s certification.129
It is clear that HHS holds patient privacy in high
regard. There are several certification criteria that vendors
must comply with in addition to separate privacy criteria for
the safe exchange and maintenance of EHRs. Moreover, the
regulation is clear that if a vendor fails to maintain these
criteria it will lose its certification.130 However, losing
certification is the only current penalty for these vendors. It is
obvious that privacy was an issue of significance considered by
HHS, but aside from having to wait a year before recertification,
there are no deterrents of consequence to ensure that vendors
will maintain their certification. Failure to comply with
certification can have dire consequences for the patients and the
facilities that the vendors serve. Failing to comply means that
the EHR software no longer meets each of the certification
regulations.131 These certification criteria are in place to better
protect patients and their information. Although not all of the
criteria are designed to increase privacy,132 maintaining every
Id. at § 170.565(a).
Id. § 170.565(b).
127 Id.
128 Id. § 170.565(h)(3).
129 Rajiv Levinthal, Two EHRs Fail Test, ONC Revokes Certification,
HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS (Apr. 25, 2013), available at http://www.healthcareinformatics.com/news-item/two-ehrs-fail-tests-onc-revokes-certifications.
130 45 C.F.R. § 170.565.
131 Id. § 170.565(b).
132 See supra notes 81-99.
125
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certification criterion is important. Failure to maintain the
criteria that directly relate to privacy may leave the door open to
breach. For example, one criterion is that the EHR must have an
automatic log out.133 If a computer is taken from a medical
facility and the EHR does not automatically log out a provider,
the information contained within may be accessible.134 The data
may also be accessed externally if the information is not
encrypted.135 For these reasons and despite the aforementioned
measures, there still needs to be smarter deterrence in order to
protect individual medical information and reflect the
importance of maintaining patient health information privacy.
C.

Credit Cards: A Look Into An Established Certification
Process

Certification is not enough, however, to properly protect
patients and their EHRs. This has been illustrated by
certification to protect private information in other areas,
specifically credit cards. Similar to the certification of EHRs, the
Payment Card Industry set up a Data Security Standard,136 with
which credit card companies must comply in order to ensure safe
security practices.137 Similar to EHR privacy standards, the Data
Security Standard includes protection, encryption, tracking and
monitoring access, access restriction, unique identification codes,
regular security tests, and anti-virus software.138 The security
criteria for certification, however, has proven not to be enough
to deter companies from failing to continuously comply. From
2006 to 2008 three people hacked data security in places such
as Hannaford, 7-Eleven, and Boston Market.139 Hackers stole
information from more than 130 million cards140 even though
45 C.F.R. § 170.302(q).
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. USA, Ctr. for Medicare & Medicaid
Servs., Security Standards: Technical Safeguards, HIPAA SECURITY SERIES, Mar. 2007,
at 3, available at http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/administrative/securityrule/
techsafeguards.pdf (discussing access control).
135 The Role of Encryption in Data Protection, supra note 122.
136 PCI SEC. STANDARDS COUNCIL, PAYMENT CARD INDUSTRY (PCI) DATA
SECURITY STANDARD VALIDATION REQUIREMENTS 1 (2008), available at
https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/pdfs/pci_dss_validation_requirements_for_qualified
_security_assessors_QSAs_v1-1.pdf.
137 Edward J. Janger Locating the Regulation of Data Privacy and Data
Security, 5 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 97, 103 (2010).
138 Id. at 104.
139 Brian Krebs, Three Indicted in Identity-Theft Case, WASH. POST (Aug. 18,
2009), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2009-08-18/news/36839944_1_data-breachesalbert-gonzalez-hackers.
140 Id.
133
134
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this breach occurred only days after Hannaford had become
certified under the Payment Card Industry.141 Within this brief
amount of time, 4.2 million card numbers were taken with
1,800 of the cards used by the hackers.142
Although EHRs and the healthcare system seem to
mirror data privacy in that they both hold sensitive personal
information, they are in fact different on two very important
levels. First, the Data Security Standard is a self-regulating
regime, meaning that the financial institutions have an
incentive to prevent breaches to the software.143 The institutions
are self-regulating because if there is a breach, the majority of
the loss will fall on the bank as opposed to the consumer.144 This
incentivizes financial institutions to prevent breaches to avoid
having to directly pay the consumers back the money that they
lost as a result of the breach. The credit card company regulates
itself because if the financial institution detects a breach, they
will then presumably take the necessary steps in order to end
the breach and stop further damage. This distinction is
important because if a self-regulating regime cannot comply
with its own certification process, it is indicative of the
necessity for EHRs to have a smarter deterrence because they
are already not self-regulating. Second, financial breaches are
limited and quantifiable. These breaches will stay within other
financial institutions and the breached institution can disclose
specific numbers, such as card numbers and PINs, to caution
their associates. The financial institutions will also be able to
clearly assign a cost on how much the consumer was damaged
by looking at the exact value that was stolen.
D.

Application to EHRs

Due to the immense amount of information that is
included within EHRs, it is more difficult to determine where
and how it will be used if EHR software is breached. EHRs and
healthcare information are not necessarily limited to medical
data. EHRs include personal material such as insurance and
billing information.145 They also include health information
141 Linda McGlasson, Hannaford Data Breach May be “Tip of the Iceberg”, BANK
INFO SECURITY (Apr. 4, 2008), http://www.bankinfosecurity.com/hannaford-data-breachmay-be-tip-iceberg-a-810/op-1. Hannaford received PCI certification on February 27 and
news of the breach was announced on March 17. Id.
142 Id.
143 Janger, supra note 137, at 109.
144 Id. at 104.
145 See PONEMON INST., supra note 25, at 2.
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such as genetic issues and disabilities.146 Moreover, health care
facilities are not limited to a single type of institution,147 such
as financial institutions with banks. This also makes it more
difficult to warn healthcare facilities of breached and stolen
information. Furthermore, healthcare breaches are not as
quantifiable. It is difficult to assign a cost to stolen health
records.148 Additionally, EHRs and the healthcare system are
also not self-regulating in the same way that financial
institutions are. There is less internal incentive to prevent
breaches because breaches will not lead to the vendors losing
the high costs that financial institutions face.149
Merely losing certification is not enough of a consequence
for failing to comply. If the vendor loses certification, their EHRs
are no longer usable.150 The medical facilities that spent
thousands or even millions of dollars151 can no longer use the
software and the patients’ information may no longer be
protected. The legal system should be encouraging continued
compliance with the certification criteria. For this reason, a
deterring monetary penalty is necessary to help protect
disclosure of personal health information.
Although failure to comply with certification may not
necessarily lead to a breach, allowing vendors not to comply
with some of the criteria may lead vendors to believe that some
criteria are more important than others. Arguably, the
requirements protecting patient privacy may appear more
important than the requirements that set up what must be
included in EHRs, but each requirement was set up by HHS for
a particular purpose and must be treated as equally important.
Disclosure can lead to significant potential concerns
such as genetic discrimination, identity theft, and an overall
failure in patient faith in the privacy and security of their
146 Peter B. Jensen et al., Mining Electronic Health Records: Towards Better
Research Applications and Clinical Care, 13 NATURE REVS. GENETICS 395, 397-98 (2012).
147 See Hospitals, Nursing Homes, & Other Health Care Facilities, N.Y. ST.
DEP’T OF HEALTH, http://www.health.ny.gov/facilities/ (last updated Sept. 2014).
148 Jim Landers, Medical Identity Is Fast-Growing and Dangerous, DALLAS
NEWS (Sept. 16, 2013, 9:00 PM), http://www.dallasnews.com/business/columnists/jimlanders/20130916-medical-identity-theft-is-fast-growing-and-dangerous.ece (noting that
breaches can impact the victim’s own medical treatment or lead to death).
149 Compare PONEMON INST., supra note 25, at 3 (providing that healthcare
facilities average $2.4 million in breach costs) with PONEMON INSTITUTE, 2011 COST OF
DATA BREACH STUDY: UNITED STATES 1 (2011), available at http://www.ponemon.org/
local/upload/file/2011_US_CODB_FINAL_5.pdf (providing that financial institution
breaches have cost as much as $7.2 million to the organization).
150 Levinthal, supra note 129.
151 See supra text accompanying notes 66 and 79.
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information. Even with these concerns the necessity of a
penalty needs to be examined as supplemental assurance of
patient’s privacy. There are already safeguards in place, such as
mandated encryption as enumerated within the privacy
criteria152 and de-identification as stated in the HIPAA Privacy
Act.153 De-identification means that specific identifying marker
must be removed in protected health information, such as, but
not limited to, names, e-mail addresses, social security numbers,
and device serial numbers.154 Through examining in place data
protection standards and certification it is clear that certification
and safeguards are not nearly enough, the vendors need further
consequences for failing to comply with data protection
standards. Unlike credit card companies, EHRs are not a selfregulating scheme because the vendors do not lose money from
breaches. However, merely losing certification does not reflect
the importance of privacy that has clearly been placed on EHRs.
There needs to be further and smarter deterrence as well.
III.

USING AN EXISTING STATUTE TO BOLSTER AND PROTECT
PATIENT PRIVACY

Due to the infancy of EHR regulations, the best place to
find a civil monetary penalty is to look at existing law. The
ideal penalty needs to be smart about what exactly it deters.
Due to the vast number of benefits of implementing EHRs,155
the deterrence should not be harsh enough to deter vendors
from creating the software. The penalty, however, should be
proportional to the harm, but efficient in its purpose.
A.

Existing Law

HIPAA, which states that people who knowingly
disclose “individually identifiable health information” will be
held accountable,156 may deter some vendor misconduct. The
Supreme Court, however, has set a relatively high standard of
mental culpability, holding that knowing disclosure requires
“proof of knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.”157
Moreover, the penalty for violating this statute is equally as
See supra text accompanying note 108.
45 C.F.R. § 164.514(a) (2012).
154 Id. § 164.514(b)(2)(i).
155 See supra notes 19-24 and accompanying text.
156 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6(a) (2010).
157 Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1, 5 (2006) (citing Bryan v. United States,
524 U.S. 184, 193 (1998)).
152

153
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high, ranging from a fine of $50,000 and the possibility of up to
a year of imprisonment to a fine of $250,000 and the possibility
of up to a ten-year prison sentence.158 These penalties, although
an effective deterrent are perhaps too harsh for EHRs. These
large fines would be in place for a vendor simply failing to
maintain a synchronized clock,159 which may disincentivize
vendors from creating EHRs ex ante. Further, a failure to
comply that may not lead to a breach should not be cause for
imprisonment, but may be cause for a fine.
Conversely, the Code of Federal Regulations, with the
HIPAA Privacy Rule, has a legal deterrence in place that closely
resembles what is ideal for certification breaches. It clearly
expresses the magnitude of failure to comply without becoming
too harsh. This regulation imposes penalties on a covered entity,
which includes “[a] health care provider who transmits any
health information in electronic form in connection with a
transaction covered under this subchapter.”160
There are four types of violations under the regulation that
are subject to a civil monetary penalty if they occur on or after
February 18, 2009.161 First, if the “covered entity” did not, and
could not through reasonable diligence, have known that a
provision was violated.162 Second, if “the violation was due to
reasonable cause and not to willful neglect.”163 Third, if the
violation was in fact due to willful neglect and was corrected within
thirty days after the covered entity knew or could have known
about the violation.164 Last, if “the violation was due to willful
neglect and was not corrected” within thirty days after the entity
knew or could have known about the violation.165 These four
violations all require lower standards of mental culpability than
HIPAA. The regulation defines willful neglect as a “conscious,
intentional failure or reckless indifference to the obligation to
comply with the administrative simplification provision[s]
violated.”166 This standard falls below knowledge, but still requires
some proof in order to show that the violator actually acted

158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166

42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6(b).
45 C.F.R. § 170.210(g).
Id. § 160.103 (definition of “Covered entity”).
Id. § 160.404(b)(2).
Id. § 160.404(b)(2)(i).
Id. § 160.404(b)(2)(ii).
Id. § 160.404(b)(2)(iii).
Id. § 160.404(b)(2)(iv).
Id. § 160.401.
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consciously or with reckless indifference. It may even be argued
that the covered entity’s failure to act is willful neglect.167
The monetary penalty that is associated with each one
is proportional to the culpability; the lower the mental
culpability, the lower the civil monetary penalty and vice
versa.168 The penalty operates on a spectrum that reflects the
degree of culpability of the vendor. The first penalty ranges
from $100 to $50,000,169 the second penalty ranges from $1,000
to $50,000,170 the third penalty ranges from $10,000 to
$50,000,171 and the last penalty must be over $50,000.172 No
penalty may exceed $1,500,000 in one calendar year, meaning
from January 1 to December 31.173
When deciding the penalty to impose on the vendor
within these ranges, the court imposing the penalty may take
into account several factors such as (1) “the nature of the
violation,”174 (2) the circumstances of the violation, including
the time period, if there was actual harm, and if the victim was
prevented from securing health care,175 (3) the degree of
culpability,176 (4) all history with compliance or violations with
the administrative simplification provisions,177 (5) the finances
of the covered entity,178 and (6) any other matters that may
affect justice.179 These six factors will determine how much, up
to the maximum imposed by the regulation, injured parties will
receive from covered entities.180
These fines are important because the ranges more
effectively reflect the degree of culpability while better
protecting the injured party. If the violator could not have
known that they were violating the provision, they are fined as
little as $100.181 However, the knowledge that they can be fined
even if they could not have known182 is incentive to vehemently
try to continuously comply with the regulations. Moreover, the
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182

See, e.g., U.S. v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241, 246 (1985).
45 C.F.R. §§ 160.404(b)(2)(i)(A), (b)(2)(ii)(A), (b)(2)(iii)(A), (b)(2)(iv)(A).
Id. §§ 160.404(b)(2)(i)(A)-(B).
Id. §§ 160.404(b)(2)(ii)(A)-(B).
Id. §§ 160.404(b)(2)(iii)(A)-(B).
Id. § 160.404(b)(2)(iv)(A).
Id. §§ 160.404(b)(2)(i)(B), (b)(2)(ii)(B), (b)(2)(iii)(B), (b)(2)(iv)(B).
Id. § 160.408(a).
Id. § 160.408(b).
Id. § 160.408(c).
Id. § 160.408(d).
Id. § 160.408(e).
Id. § 160.408(f).
Id. § 160.404.
Id. § 160.404(b)(2)(i)(A).
Id. § 160.404(b)(2)(i).

586

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80:2

ranges are broad enough for the court to take into account a
variety of factors that led to the violation.183 This allows fines to
be imposed entirely on a case-by-case basis and would create
fairer penalties because each penalty is decided based on
individual factors.
It is important to note that this civil monetary penalty
does not go to the victims of the failure to comply (i.e. the
patients, whether or not harm actually occurred). Rather, this
penalty goes directly to the secretary of the agency imposing
the civil monetary penalty to be dispensed of in four ways.184
The first disposal only applies to penalties that arise either
from grants to states for medical assistance programs or the
maternal and child health series block grant.185 Second, any
amount of the penalty, which has been taken from a trust fund,
must be equally reimbursed to that trust fund.186 Third, if the
claim arises out of a federal health care program, any portion
that has been paid by the program will be equally reimbursed
to the program.187 Moreover, anything recovered under HIPAA
must be deposited to the Federal Hospital Insurance Trust
Fund.188 Fourth, any remainder must be deposited into the
United States Treasury.189
B.

Applying the HIPAA Privacy Rule Civil Monetary
Penalty to EHR Certification

The HIPAA Privacy Rule civil monetary penalty, in
operation, is wholly separate from EHR certification criteria.
Rather, this civil monetary penalty is imposed if the Secretary
of HHS determines that the “covered entity has violated an
administrative simplification provision.”190 The only federal
regulation mentioned in the definition that may establish
requirements or prohibitions that create administrative
simplification provisions is Subchapter C within Title 45.191 The
certification criteria developed by HHS is found in Subchapter D
of Title 45,192 so the civil monetary penalty is separate and apart
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192

Id. § 160.408.
42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(f) (2011).
Id. § 1320a-7a(f)(1).
Id. § 1320a-7a(f)(2).
Id. § 1320a-7a(f)(3).
Id.
Id. § 1320a-7a(f)(4).
45 C.F.R. § 160.402(a) (2012).
Id. § 160.302(3).
Id. § 170.302.
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from the criteria. As a result, it can easily be argued that a
vendor would not be subject to a civil monetary penalty if they
stopped complying with the certification criteria.
This civil monetary penalty must either apply to
Subchapter D as well, or Subchapter D must create a similar
penalty to impose if vendors stop regulating certification
criteria. Subchapter D is not so different from Subchapter C to
warrant an argument that the same civil monetary penalties
should not apply to both. Subchapter C is the HIPAA Privacy
Rule, which was enacted to better protect patient privacy and
medical records as well as to provide safeguards for the privacy
of personal health information.193 The certification criteria
enumerated within Subchapter D also ensures patient privacy
and sets up various ways to protect the sensitive personal
health information contained within EHRs. The certification
criteria so closely resembles the privacy protections within the
HIPAA Privacy Rule that they too should be considered
administrative simplification procedures under the definition
provided by the regulation. Through this clarification, vendors
will be held to the same standard as other covered entities. It is
unclear whether EHRs fall under the definition of a covered
entity. Although not health care providers, EHRs are
implemented by providers and are used to electronically
transmit health information in connection with a transaction.
However, for clarification, the definition of a covered entity
may need to be expanded to include healthcare entities that
transmit electronic health information. Moreover, an
administrative simplification provision is “any requirement or
prohibition established by” various statutes and regulations.194
EHR certification is a requirement established by a regulation,
which must be met in order to receive ONC certification.
Imposing this civil monetary penalty would not preempt
victims from filing suits for their own damages. In its current
use, the civil monetary penalty is imposed through a civil suit
“in the name of the United States,” sometimes brought by qui
tam.195 Because the party in the suit is the United States and not
the individuals harmed, the patients or medical facilities may
bring separate suits with various claims, such as negligence,

193 The
Privacy Rule, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/administrative/privacyrule/ (last visited Feb. 1, 2015).
194 45 C.F.R. § 160.302.
195 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a (2011).
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breach of contract, restitution, breaching of fiduciary duty, or
breaching the good faith and fair dealing covenant.196
Breaches are supposed to be reported to HHS. If the civil
monetary penalty is imposed, however, there may be reluctance
from the vendors to report. Vendors lose nothing for failure to
report breaches. This failure to report would inevitably increase
the damage to the patients. Consequently, it can be argued that
the civil monetary penalty will harm, rather than help, patients
through discouraging vendors from reporting breaches to HHS
or failing to fix breaches in a timely manner.
Due to this inability to self-regulate, this civil monetary
penalty cannot simply be adopted as is; there needs to be a safe
harbor provision. A safe harbor provision would incentivize the
vendor to report a breach of privacy by putting protections for
the vendors in place. The failure to report should be a factor
that a judge would consider when determining the amount of
the civil monetary penalty to impose. Without the safe harbor
there is no guarantee that vendors will report breaches to HHS
for fear of having to pay these penalties. Breaches range from
external hackers to stolen computers.197 Vendors should be
encouraged, and not afraid, to report these breaches to HHS to
better protect patients and to help avoid breaches in the future
by determining what caused the breach.
Vendors should also be encouraged to report their own
failures if they realized they have stopped complying with the
certification criteria before a breach occurs. In this situation,
vendors may assume that they can resume complying with
certification without informing HHS because there has not been
any damage to EHR security. Vendors may be discouraged from
reporting this information because even without damage they may
still be liable for the high penalties included in the Subchapter C
civil monetary penalty. The purpose of reporting the failure to
comply is to help HHS rather than to hurt the vendors. HHS
should be made aware of these failures to better understand its
relatively new certification scheme. This information may help
assist decisions in future regulation amendments. In order to help
both HHS and the vendors, a safe harbor, such as a “bifurcated
notice scheme,” should be implemented.198
Resnick v. AvMed, Inc., 693 F.3d 1317, 1323 (11th Cir. 2012).
Abraham Shaw, Data Breach: From Notification to Prevention Using PCI
DSS, 43 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 517, 518 (2010).
198 See, e.g., Paul M. Schwartz & Edward J. Janger, Notification of Data
Security Breaches, 105 MICH. L. REV. 913, 960 (2007).
196
197
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This scheme provides five benefits: (1) it helps the
vendors determine if they should tell the medical facilities and
patients of the breach or failure to comply, (2) better coordinates
to warn similar facilities where the stolen information may be
used or vendors who may also be targeted, (3) narrowly
determines who should be put on notice of the breach or failure
to comply, (4) it minimizes ability of the vendor to determine
that notice is unnecessary when in actuality it is, and (5) it
enforces maintaining certification criteria through both
encouraging vendors to approach HHS and coercion to maintain
for fear of the penalty.199
A bifurcated notice scheme would work as follows: when
the vendor notices that they have been breached, with or without
damage to patient health information, or when the vendor notices
that they have stopped complying with certification criteria, the
vendor must inform HHS.200 HHS will then investigate and
determine which patients, if any, should be on notice that their
health information may have been compromised. Through this,
vendors may avoid putting patients on notice if they discover the
failure to comply early enough.201 HHS will most likely decide, to
maintain patient’s faith in EHRs, not to inform patients of failing
to comply if the failure did not lead to a breach of information. If
the vendors follow this bifurcated notice scheme and inform HHS
immediately, it will positively influence the court’s decision when
determining if the civil monetary penalty imposed will be on the
higher or lower end of the range. If the vendor does not report the
failure to comply, it will influence the same decision to make the
penalty higher, which would encourage more compliance with
privacy standards.202
If the civil monetary penalty is expanded, however, there
will be an absurd outcome where the actual thief will pay the
same monetary penalty as the willfully negligent vendor. It is
possible that if someone steals individually identifiable medical
records due to the vendor’s willful neglect to uphold and
maintain the certification criteria, the actual thief—that is, the
person who knowingly steals the records—may potentially pay
the same amount in penalty damages as the EHR vendor.
HIPAA violators, persons who knowingly use or “obtain[ ]
Id.
Cf. id. at 960-62 (discussing the notification from a breached entity to the CRA).
201 Cf. id. at 962-63 (discussing that the CRA will determine when consumers
will be notified).
202 Cf. id. at 964-65 (discussing the $500 penalty for failure to disclose).
199
200
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individually identifiable health information,”203 such as
hackers, can pay up to $50,000 in damages.204 In the lower
three tiers of the HIPAA Privacy Rule, covered entities,
potentially the EHR vendors, may also pay up to $50,000.205
For example, if a vendor’s willful neglect caused a
failure to comply with the certification criteria, even if it was
corrected within thirty days, the door may have been left open
within those thirty days for a breach. A hacker could then
knowingly take that opportunity and steal medical data. In this
case, both the vendor and the hacker could be liable for up to
$50,000 in damages, even though the vendor was only willfully
negligent and corrected the problem, and the hacker knowingly
stole the information. The penalty for the vendor and the
hacker should be different here because the mental culpability
of each party is vastly different. The vendor in this example
corrected the problem within thirty days of the discovery of the
problem, even though its own willful neglect led to the problem.
Through fixing the problem, it is clear that the vendor did not
want to harm the patients whose information is stored by the
vendor. However, the hacker knowingly went into the database
and took the information to use for his own mal-intentioned
purpose. The hacker wanted to harm the patients in order to
gain something for himself. For this reason, the penalty
imposed on the vendor and the penalty imposed on the hacker
should reflect their separate culpability.
Moreover, it cannot be assumed that a court will take
care of this because, in the first case, the HIPAA violator will
be heard in court by an Article III judge. In the second case,
however, because HHS enacted the HIPAA Privacy Rule,
violators will presumably be charged in an administrative
court. However, the HIPAA penalty also states that violators
may be imprisoned for up to a year as well.206 It is unlikely that
this imprisonment is enough to justify the difference between
knowingly taking another’s personal health information and
willfully neglecting certification criteria. With the imposition of
the civil monetary penalty, rulemakers should address this
issue and either update HIPAA penalties or find another way
to distinguish the two penalties. Although the HIPAA penalty
is criminal and the Subchapter C penalty is civil, it should still
203
204
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42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6(a) (2010).
Id. § 1320d-6(b)(1).
45 C.F.R. §§ 160.404(b)(2)(i)(A), (b)(2)(ii)(A), (b)(2)(iii)(A) (2012).
42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6(b)(1).
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be addressed that the criminal penalty, with a higher burden,
will impose the same monetary amount as the civil penalty.
An 11th Circuit case resulting from a pre-EHR
certification breach demonstrated the necessity of the civil
monetary penalty even if it is not clear where the breach
occurred. The court in Resnick v. AvMed Inc. raised a causation
issue that would also arise with the implementation of this civil
monetary penalty. The court found that in order to find AvMed
accountable for the theft, it must be shown that the identity
theft occurred due to the laptop theft and not from a breach by
a third-party, such as the bank.207 The identity theft in Resnick
was purely monetary and not related to the victim’s medical
history or insurance,208 so the nexus may not be clearly
established.209 With the implementation of the civil monetary
penalty, even if a bank’s breach caused the identity theft, the
EHR vendor would still pay the penalty if the vendor failed to
comply with certification. The reasoning for this is clearly
demonstrated in the discussion between the majority and the
dissent in Resnick. The majority finds it plausible that the
stolen laptops caused the identity theft,210 whereas the dissent
finds that there were not enough facts discovered to clearly
establish where the identity theft occurred.211 Presumably,
most identity thefts will echo Resnick in that it will be difficult
to pinpoint exactly where the identity theft occurred, so the
civil monetary penalty will further deter vendors from failing
to comply in order to avoid paying penalties for identity thefts
that were not caused by the vendor’s fault.
Identity thefts from EHRs are not limited to economic loss.
Through stealing information contained within EHRs, the victims
may suffer from insurance fraud or genetic discrimination.212 Due
to these types of identity theft, the nexus between the breach and
the theft will diminish because third parties with access to this
information are severely limited,213 as opposed to the number of
third parties with access to monetary information.214

Resnick v. AvMed, Inc., 693 F.3d 1317, 1326-27 (11th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 1322.
209 Id. at 1331 (Pryor, J., dissenting).
210 Id. at 1327 (majority opinion).
211 Id. at 1330 (Pryor, J., dissenting).
212 See supra text accompanying notes 31 & 33.
213 People have one EHR, which limits the number of people who have access.
214 Resnick, 693 F.3d at 1331 (discussing sensitive information received in the
mail, credit cards, and how third parties get the plaintiffs’ information).
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THE ADDED EXPENSE IS SUBSTANTIALLY OUTWEIGHED
BY THE INCREASED BENEFITS

There are four separate parties involved with EHRs: the
medical facilities, the patients, the vendors, and the government.
The implementation of a civil monetary penalty will affect each of
these parties. One of the disadvantages of implementing EHRs is
the continuous expense of their maintenance on the medical
facilities,215 so it may be unclear if the benefits of implementing a
civil monetary penalty will outweigh the costs associated.
However, these high expenses paid to set up and maintain the
EHR software come directly from the medical facility, whereas
the vendors would pay the penalty for failure to comply with
certification. But even with the high cost of EHRs, medical
facilities will end up saving in the long term. The overall
expense of medical care is estimated to decrease by $400 billion
a year due to the implementation of EHRs.216 Medical facilities
may be more willing to spend the money to set up EHRs
knowing that there is a legal deterrence for the vendors to make
sure that they maintain their certification. Without this
deterrence, a medical facility may spend up to $10 million to set
up an EHR system217 just for the vendor to stop complying with
the certification criteria and have its certification revoked.
Additionally, this knowledge may also help to encourage
facilities to choose cloud-based vendors once they are aware that
some of the security issues are deterred through the civil
monetary penalty, which may be beneficial in the future.218
Cloud-based vendors should be encouraged because it is easier to
care for patients nationally and internationally.219 Moreover,
these vendors provide critical management, such as back-ups
and maintenance, leaving more time for the facilities to focus on
patient care.220 So, the civil monetary penalty and subsequent
deterrence will benefit the medical facilities as such.
The implementation of a civil monetary penalty will also
benefit patients by assisting them in reaching an educated
decision as to whether they should consent to the use of their
information in EHRs. The knowledge that there is a penalty for
failing to adequately protect the contained medical information
215
216
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See supra text accompanying notes 38-40.
Analytics in Healthcare, supra note 6, at 3.
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See infra text accompanying notes 230-32.
Phillips, supra note 63, at 25.
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should ease patients when making their decision. HHS
advocates for patients to meaningfully consent to the use of
EHRs prior to including their information within them. As part
of that advocacy, HHS has developed explicit guidelines for
doctors to ensure that patients give meaningful consent to the
use of EHRs in the course of their care.
There are six aspects, according to HHS, that patients
should consider in order to give meaningful consent.221 The fifth
consideration factor, that EHRs comply with patient expectations,
most likely and understandably includes a patient’s belief that if
he or she agreed to store and transfer his or her records
electronically, then those in charge of such records will use due
diligence to protect and secure the records.222 Patients will more
likely be comfortable knowing that the vendors securing their
records will be held accountable of a breach regardless if
individual patients are harmed.223 Moreover, according to
research prepared for the ONC, “if we are to reap the benefits
of information exchange, patients must be assured that
appropriate technology solutions, business practices, and policy
protections will be employed to prevent their information from
being used in undesirable ways or to generally impinge upon
their rights and civil liberties.”224 This is the heart of
meaningful consent. Patients want to be entirely certain that
their information is being used properly and that their private
information is safe.
The National Coordinator for Health Information
Technology stated that there must be clear policies that

221 These aspects are: (1) the decision should be based on education; (2) the
patient should satisfactorily look at all material that will help make the decision; (3)
understand and agree why health information may be transferred and exchanged; (4)
understand that EHRs are not used to discriminate patients and they are not a
prerequisite for adequate health care; (5) they comply with patient expectations; and (6)
that initial consent to use EHRs is revocable at any time in the future. Patient Consent
for Electronic Health Information Exchange, HEALTHIT.GOV, http://www.healthit.gov/
providers-professionals/patient-consent-electronic-health-information-exchange (last visited
Feb. 1, 2015).
222 Kathryn Marchesini & Joy Pritts, Meaningful Consent in Electronic Health
Information Exchange: A Technology-Centric Approach, HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG (Sept.
17, 2013), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2013/09/17/meaningful-consent-in-electronichealth-information-exchange-a-technology-centric-approach/.
223 Pear, supra note 50, at 3 (“Until people are more confident about the
security of electronic medical records . . . it’s vitally important that we err on the side of
privacy.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
224 MELISSA M. GOLDSTEIN, J.D. & ALISON L. REIN, M.S., CONSUMER CONSENT
OPTIONS FOR ELECTRONIC HEALTH INFORMATION EXCHANGE: POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
AND
ANALYSIS 1 (Mar. 23, 2010), available at http://www.healthit.gov/
sites/default/files/choicemodelfinal032610.pdf.
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“strengthen existing protections”225 for E-Health. A deterring
civil monetary penalty will do exactly that; it will strengthen the
existing protections enumerated within EHR certification
criteria. Further, in 2012, it was estimated that 1.85 million
people were victims of medical identity theft.226 Imposing the
civil monetary penalty and holding the vendors liable for all
failures to comply, regardless of breaches or harm, will
presumably lower this number, making it less likely that
patients’ sensitive information will be compromised. For these
reasons, the penalty will benefit patients.
The civil monetary penalty will benefit vendors even
though they are the ones who will ultimately pay the fine.
Under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009,
companies that comply with goals outlined by the ONC may
receive subsidies from the Secretary of HHS.227 The purposes of
this federal incentive are to protect patient health information,
reduce health care costs, improve coordination between different
medical practices, and improve the overall effectiveness and
quality of health care services.228 EHRs do all of this,229 so the
vendors who implement EHRs and comply with the certification
criteria are able to receive the federal incentive payment.
Through this payment, the direct expense that vendors must
pay is lessened.
The civil monetary penalty will also assist with cohesion
between different EHR vendors.230 A major challenge with the
use of EHRs developed by many different vendors is health
information exchange, that is, that different software cannot
communicate with each other.231 This is a problem because if a
patient goes to a doctor who uses one vendor but then goes to a
second doctor who uses a different vendor, the second doctor will
not have access to records from the first doctor until they are
safely transferred. Likewise, once the second doctor is finished
with the patient, the information that he collected will not be in
the record that the first doctor has until the information is once
again transferred and combined. Right now, this is a huge cost of
EHRs. Medical facilities are spending millions of dollars to use
Id.
See PONEMON INST., supra note 31, at 1.
227 42 U.S.C. § 300jj-31 (2009).
228 Id. § 300jj-11.
229 See supra text accompanying notes 88-95.
230 See generally Jensen et al., supra note 146, at 403 (discussing the
developments towards interoperability).
231 Adler-Milstein & Jha, supra note 54, at 1695.
225
226
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them,232 but different facilities cannot even talk to each other
easily regarding one patient.233
It is logical that both the cohesive vendors and the
software, which creates the cohesiveness, will fall under
Subchapter D, so they would be subject to the civil monetary
penalty. Software regarding EHR storage and transfer will need
to fit the criteria in Subchapter D to receive certification and
then would have to comply to avoid decertification and the civil
monetary penalty. Moreover, these vendors and software, more
so than the vendors and software existing today, will need this
protection. EHRs today have limited reach. It is presumably
more difficult for a hacker in California to access EHRs in a New
York office, and even more so if the EHRs are on-premise. With
vendor cohesion, all EHRs will turn into cloud-based records
because they are easier to use for multiple facilities,234 making
it easier for anyone anywhere to access any records. The
implementation of the civil monetary penalty will help to
facilitate the cohesion between vendors. The civil monetary
penalty will inevitably lead to better EHR vendors because
they will be fiscally responsible for their actions. This would
then lead to better EHRs because breaches would occur less.
The next step is cohesiveness between vendors,235 which would
then require cloud-based EHRs.
Patients will again be more comfortable with the
fluidity created by cohesion between vendors because of the
civil monetary penalty. They will feel confident knowing that
the people who are in charge of the health information
exchange and their personal health information are liable for
breaches, regardless of the type of violation, and that the
vendors must uphold certain criteria or be penalized.
Additionally, the imposition of the civil monetary
penalty will put patients at ease with the privacy concerns
surrounding cloud-based records.236 Due to the increased amount
of breaches in this model, there is more incentive for the vendors
to continuously comply with certification, for fear of substantial
penalties for each breach. This may even encourage the vendors
to impose additional safety measures. Further, this will help
protect patient privacy if the cloud-based servers are kept
Analytics in Healthcare, supra note 6, at 3.
Adler-Milstein & Jha, supra note 54, at 1695.
234 duPont et al., supra note 77, at 402.
235 See generally Jensen et al., supra note 146 (discussing the developments
towards interoperability).
236 See supra text accompanying notes 67-76.
232

233
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outside of the United States. Although the vendors will have to
comply with the foreign privacy laws for maintaining the
server,237 they will still be subject to the certification criteria and
the civil monetary penalty. So, even if foreign privacy laws are
less strict, the vendors will be responsible for the minimum
safeguards provided within the HHS regulation.
HHS implemented the certification regulations238 to make
certain the EHRs, which contain the personal information of
patients, met criteria that the agency deemed important.
Although the criteria are both administrative and clinical,239 the
vendors should show the same amount of care to comply with
each criterion. Imposing the civil monetary penalty would
disincentivize the vendors from deviating from the agency
regulation. Moreover, if the civil monetary penalty was imposed,
the fine would be directed to the Secretary of HHS.240 It would
partly be used to reimburse HHS for the subsidy provided to that
vendor241 as part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
of 2009.242 Imposing the civil monetary penalty would lead to
more compliance with HHS’ certification criteria regulations and
more protection of patients’ medical data.
CONCLUSION
E-Health and EHRs have greatly expanded over the last
fifty years. The implementation of EHRs has led to increased
safety, fewer mistakes, and cheaper healthcare. However,
privacy continues to be a major concern. Privacy of patient
medical information is so important to lawmakers that they
have an entire rule, the HIPAA Privacy Rule, outlining specific
ways to safely ensure that privacy will be maintained while
transferring health information. Further, in order to make
certain that EHRs, which have the added responsibility of
storing patient information, continue to maintain patient
privacy, HHS implemented numerous criteria that vendors
must comply with in order to receive certification as well as
several privacy standards.
As shown through other forms of certification, this is not
enough. There needs to be a legal deterrence to help maintain the
237
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integrity of EHRs and the integrity of the private medical data.
HHS should either expand the civil monetary penalty included
within the HIPAA Privacy Rule, that does not encompass the
certification criteria, or consider implementing a similar rule that
will solely apply to certification. Vendors need an incentive to
report breaches to HHS or else we run the risk that they will
handle these internally to the detriment of patients. A safe harbor
provision should also be included within this civil monetary
penalty stating that if vendors report all breaches to HHS, it will
reflect favorably on the vendors when a decision as to the amount
of the penalty is made. Moreover, allowing HHS to deal with
breaches internally will prevent unnecessary patient notification
when a breach may not affect the patient’s individual EHR. Even
though a civil monetary penalty will be a cost to vendors, the
ultimate benefit substantially outweighs the cost. Not only does
the vendor benefit, but patients and medical facilities benefit as
well due to the additional incentive to continuously comply with
certification and the dividends that will follow for patient privacy.
Implementing this civil monetary penalty will benefit EHRs,
vendors, healthcare providers, and, most importantly, patients.
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